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AN OVERVIEW OF NIGERIA'S MACROECONOMIC
ENVIRONMENT
By
Prof. Thi Ajayi*
"Africa's once post-colonial era has proven to be a time of economic despair, with
conditions in the vast majority ofAfrican countries today as bad, if not worse than ever
befo re" (Centre/or International Economic Growth, Nov. 14. 14. 1991 p. 1)

INTRODUCTION
It is a great honor and privilege for me to be here at this year's 4th executive
seminar on "Creating an Enabling Environment for Economic Development in Nigeria"
At the 3rd Executive Seminar last year, 1 had the opportunity to address this very
important body on "The Role of the Central Bank in Economic development." It is very
gratifying to note that the issue of the growth and economic development of Nigeria is
the theme of this year's seminar and is being given serious attention by the Departments
of Research and PersoMel of the Central Bank of Nigeria.
I have been asked to present a paperon "An Overview of Nigeria's Macroeconomic
Environment" . As simple as the topic may appear to be at a first glance, 1 nevertheless
have a number of problems in dealing with it. The first relates to the analytical
framework within which a structural presentation can be made within the stipulated
time. Specifically, what are the constellation of factors that must be present before the
macroeconomy is conducive to growth and development? And what really are the issues
in economic growth and development? The second relates to how far back in our history
l should go in order to make the presentation and what are the key periodic benchmarks
that should be utilized in the analysis. Of course, the issue of what constitutes the major
macroeconomic environment may not have a generally accepted answer. Indeed, it
should be realised that the macroeconomic environment of a nation is not a static affair.
A review of this nature may therefore require probing into the political and economic
history of Nigeria. This certainly requires a lot of work because of the quantum of
materials which cannot effectively be dealt with within the time allocated to this lecture
and the discussion thereafter.
• Prof I. Ajayi is of the Department of Economics, University of Ibadan.
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My assignment is not in anyway made easier by my association at international
scholarship arena where usually in recent times, the Nigerian issues are at seminars,
discussion groups treated with scorn and derision.
Indeed, my several sojourn in Washington as a consultant/researcher has almost
turn me psychologically to the Washington belief that nothing ever works in Nigeria,
a country full of potentials that have essentially been wasted. Nigeria in all cases
represents the textbook case of general macroeconomic failure. In most cases the
macroeconomic framework of Nigeria is often compared with that of Indonesia, a
country whose all macroeconomic data were less favorable than Nigeria at the dawn of
the petroleum era but which today has become a very successful country. Nigeria is seen
as a country where corruption and lack of transparency is endemic. Of course, increased
transparency and accountability in government, respect for human rights, and adherence
to the rule of law are necessary macroeconomic environment for economic growth and
development. On this platform alone it its very easy for me to conclude by simply saying
that the macroeconomic environment ofNigeria has mainly been hostile and unconducive
to growth and development. Be that as it may , it is my hope, however, that in dealing
with this important topic, 1will endeavour to grapple with it knowing fully well that the
number of people here are not only Nigerians but do know and understand all that 1shall
try to analyze but would also be sympathetic because our destiny lies in the unity of
purpose and definite resolve for a better tomorrow if indeed the past has not been as
glamorous as it should have been. The truth is that we may have progressed in some area
but whether we could have done better (more growth and development) than we have
done so far is another issue.
My task therefore will be to provide a general overview and leave the other
technical sessions to fill in the necessary gaps as they each deal in the micro aspects and
make policy prescription of the various facets which my paper will inevitably touch
upon.

n.

SOME STYLIZED FACTS
Permit me to say upfront that the existence of a stable, undistorted macroeconomic
environment is the foundation of a strategy for economic growth and development.
What is this environment? The macroeconomic environment consists of the various
policies that are put in place to affect every aspect of economic activity. Thus, all aspects
offiscal, monetary, exchange rate, pricing policy and measures to foster the development
of private sector activities etc. are all part and parcel of the macroeconomic environment
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of a country. There is evidence that better policies mean faster growth.
Evidences from successful economies show the need to maintain good
macroeconomic policies as measured by low inflation, prudent fiscal stance, and
realistic exchange rate, and absence of parallel exchange rate. Other policies that matter
are those affecting finance and trade, and open trade regime. Evidence from what is
usually referred as the 'East Asian Miracle' is useful: "Growth resulted from getting the
policy basic right. Macroeconomic management was unusually good, providing the
stable environment essential for private investment. Policies to increase the intergrity
ofthe banking system, and to make it more accessible to nontraditional savers, increased
the level of financial savings Education policies that focused on primary and secondary
schooling generated rapid increase in labor force skills. Agricultural policies stressed
productivity change and did not tax the rural economy excessively..." (The world Bank,
1993: The Asian Tiger Miracle .. p. 6).
In its widest sense, macroeconomic environment is made up of those created by
domestic policies and the international economic environment. There is no watertight
compartmentalization because domestic policies can always be utilized efficiently to
mitigate the negative influences of hostile external shocks. Thus in the process of the
discussion, we shall be talking of those macroeconomic policies as well as those outside
policies (the international macroeconomic environment) which affect the performance
of the domestic economy. What really constitutes a conducive macroeconomic
environment has been stated in four simple statements by Summers (1992 p.6-9):
.(i) Sound macroeconomic policies with sustainable fiscal deficit and realistic exchange
rate are a prerequisite for progress.
(ii) - A permissive rather than a prohibitive policy environment is essential for the
private sector.
(iii) Government has no business attempting to directly manage the production of
goods and services.
(iv) No country has ever developed without adequate provision of basic investment in
infrastructure and in people.
Stated upfront, what are the domestic factors that are likely to affect growth and
development. A summary will look as follows:
realistic exchange rate;
balanced budget and a small ratio of government consumption to GDP;
open trade policy as opposed to inward-oriented, import substitution strategy and
tariff regimes;
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poljtical stability or good governance;
development of human capital.
Of all endowments, human capital probably does most to fuel long-term economic
gains. Simply put countries with skilled people grow faster.
- financial strength (countries with more financial sectors grow faster)

III. A BIRD'S-EYE-VIEW OF NIGERIA'S MACROECONOMIC
ENVIRONMENT
The review of Nigeria's macroeconomic environment can be undertaken using
different approaches. One can focus on either the various political regimes or periodic
analysis as reference points. Alternatively. one can focus on the period before the
Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) and the period after. I have decided to review the
macroeconomic environment along all these approaches. The period of analysis is
broken down into four periods:
(i) The period from independence to shortly after (1960-65).
(ii) 1966-70,
(iii) 1971-85,
(iv) 1986-1996.

The period 1960-65
This period can be referred to as the period of high expectations when it was
possible to dream of the better tomorrow for all Nigerians. It was a period when even
~hough the available resources were comparatively low, Nigeria was supported by a
number of friendly nations that were willing and able to give a lending hand. As a result
of the friendly atmosphere and the democratic culture which Nigeria was pursuing.
Nigeria benefitted from technical aids in all forms including the exchange of professional
staff in its industries and universities, scholarships for a large number of its citizen etc.
Agriculture was seen as the primary lever and the leading sector ofthe economy in terms
of the total employment, source of government revenue and the extent of the gross
domestic product (GDP) originating in it. A significant proportion of the GDP ( up to 60
percent) originated from this sector. Foreign exchange was earned primarily through the
export of commodities. Agriculture was accorded the right attention and priority. The
need for planning was realised very early in Nigeria's history and the first development
plan was drawn in 1962, the aim being to increase the economic welfare. Even though
the resources were limited, Nigeria was able nevertheless to lay necessary foundation
(i)

Ajayi'

844

in the areas of infrastructure and education. The monetary and fiscal policies pursued
at that time - mainly credit ease and cheap money, and tax holidays to mention-a few of
the policies were aimed at fostering economic growth and development through the
provision of necessary fostering economic environment for the development of all
sectors - private and public. Even though Nigeria had a rough ride with democracy in
earlier years culminating in the declaration in the then Western Region, the unity of
purpose of the nation was nevertheless quite clear: to build a nation and improve the
economic welfare of the citizenry.
(ii) The period 1966-70.
Two major events which had significant effects on the macroeconomic environment
occurred during this period one of which still haunts us till today. The first was the coup
of 15 January, 1966. Even though some people jubilated when the event occurred inspite
of the bloodbath accompanying it, the damage that was done to both the political and
economic fabric of society was not appreciated at that time. That singular act of
commission or omission altered the operational platform of the macroeconomy, its
environment and the philosophy of operation forever.
The second event though related to the first in a significant way was the civil war

with the then Eastern region of Nigeria. This was a period when Nigeria was internally
at loggerhead with itself. Nigeria was involved in a civil war with one ofits components.
Not only was the war harsh and created bitterness, it created disruption of all kinds, wars
naturally stop development. In the process of the war, some of the infrastructural
facilities which were built in the early years were destroyed. The civil war disrupted all
facets of economic activity in general and disrupted in particular the full exploration of
oil in the war affected areas. Third, the war brought into being the birth of the legl\.Cy
of stringent controls.
(iii) The period 1971-85.
After the civil war in 1970, Nigeria tried to pull itself together through a program
of reconstruction of the war-torn area, and improvement in the standard of living of its
citizens. Luckily, N1geria was blessed with oil resources which formed the bedrock of
the needed growth and development. In the 1970s, Nigeria benefitted from oil shocks
the first of which brought about a quadrupling of the price level. The two significant
shocks were in 1974 and 1979-80. In the period 1972-74, Federal revenue from oil
increased five-fold constituting 80 percent of revenue. Consequent to the oil revenue
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bonanza, there was an investment boom that lasted the period from 1974-76, generated
mainly by the sharp improvement in the foreign terms of trade. Following the discovery
of oil and the ensuing financial resources accruing from it, the structure and the
macroeconomic environment of Nigeria changed. The new wealth affected radically the
scope and content of investment, production and consumption patterns, government
approach to macroeconomic management, and otherprograms and policies implemented.
Investment/GDP ratio increased from less than 12 percent in 1971 to more than 25
percent in 1977. Nigeria drew three successive development plans: 1970-74, 1975-80
and 1981-85. The main objectives of these plans were to stimulate investment, output
and employment, guarantee food self-sufficiency, generate adequate foreign exchange,
mobilize domestic savings, improve the standard of living of the people and maintain
good economic and political relations with the rest of the world (CBN, 1993).
In alignment with the development philosophy, government not only enacted
regulations to control prices and allocate foreign exchange, public enterprises were also
created. Oil was seen as the catalyst element in Nigeria's growth prospects as enunciated
in several government documents. According to the third Development Plan document,
for example, (FGN, 1975, p. 135):
"The importance of mining and quarrying sector in Nigeria has substantially
increased in recent years. Thus oil sector hasrecome the main engine of growth of the
Nigerian economy. Due to the enhanced level of activity in this sector, the Nigerian
economy is experiencing unprecedented growth."
Thus the dawn of the petroleum era altered the macroeconomic environment of the
economy in a number of ways. First, the illusion was created that money was no longer
a constraint. Second, as a result of the great reliance on oil, it substituted for the position
earlier occupied by agriculture in the economy. The general belief that industrialization
was the key to rapid economic growth led credence to the need to tax agriculture which
would have been the engine of growth to provide resources for building the industrial
sector. Consequently, agriculture was neglected, and the agro-industrial linkages
expected in the earlier plans was forgotten.
Third, the economy was transformed from a basic subsistence agriculture to a
monetized economy that was fueled by oil exploration and all emphasis was placed on
resources from oil. Various government documents emphasize the role attached to the
oil revenue. For example, (FGN. , 1980 p. 38):
"The basic strategy will therefore be that of using the resources generated by this
wasting asset to ensure an all round expansion in the productive capacity of the economy
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so as to lay a solid foundation for self-sustaining growth and development in the
shortest time possible ...
Fourth. the financial resources of government gave it more prominence in the
economy. Consequently, significant government intervention took place in all sectors
of the economy: direct participation in production activities, development of
infrastructural facilities which proved to be beneficial, ownership of schools at all levels
including tertiary education including the adoption of free education at the tertiary level,
and development in other social services sector. Of course the basic development
paradigm adopted was the significant involvement of government in production and the
regulation of economic activity. The rationale for sole reliance on the state was based
primarily on the absence of capital outside the state control. lack of enterpreneurs and
indeed the general belief about market imperfections. It was widely believed that the
involvement of the state in economic activity would eliminate market failure. set the
stage for economic growth and improved welfare of the citizenry. That result was
however not to be achieved because the state was overextended, stressed relative to the
exiting institutional capacities which were weak to the point of inefficiency. Of course
with the financial wealth, attention was not given as previously to the financial viability
of projects and efficiency of projects. The preponderance government in economic
activity led to the marginalization of the private sector. Fifth, the oil boom produced
significant change in the production. investment and consumption patterns of the
country leading to the increased taste for foreign goods which were purchased with the
seemingly abundant foreign exchange earnings to supplement domestic supplies.
The greatest test which the nation faced and was not solved was the distinction
between perception and behavior with respect to a temporary and permanent windfall
which the oil revenue was. Till 1977, the perception of government was that the revenue
from oil was permanent. After 1977, the oil revenue was seen as a temporary inflow of
resources. In each of the two perceptions. however. the macroeconomic behavior did
not alter towards better behavior as expenditures continued to soar. In a large sense.
macroeconomic policies were couched within the context of the existing resources. The
management of the exchange rate did not follow the normal--0Kpectations of theory and
was indeed over valued. As the price of oil fell the exchange rate continued to
appreciated. The value of the real exchange rate increased more than 100 percent
between 1973-78. As the value of the Naira appreciated with the growth in oil revenue,
the competitiveness of exports was naturally at a disadvantages.
Sixth, the massive investment programs altered the structure of wages and prices.
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Indeed the inflation rate in Nigeria which was only about 3.3 percent in 1973 rose to
about 33.3 percent in 1975. Government deficit continued to mount and expenditures
at both the federal and state levels exceeded revenue. Nigeria borrowed massively in
this period to take care of the shortfall in the economy; the demand for imports far
exceeded the earnings from oil. The prospect of the Nigerian economy was adjudged
to be very bright by the international community. Nigeria was borrowing at a period
when the interest rate was not only floating but was also very high thus sowing the seed
of the external debt crisis which subsequently plagued the nation. The oil market first
crashed in 1978. The rise in the price of petroleum in 1979 assured that all was not lost.
It was however a short reprieve as conditions worsened yearly by the 1980s. Between
1973 and 1981, Nigeria collected sizable windfall estimated at about 20 percent of ODP
from increases in the price of oil. Nigeria's GDP per capital dropped considerably after
1973 and the real GDP per capital at the end of 1980 was below what it was in 1973.
The reason for the fall in per capital income can be attributed to a number offactors.
First, the large surpluses in the budget gave way to larger budget deficits. Second,
government consumption almost doubled in the periods 1965-72. Third, Nigeria
directed its spending to cities as opposed to the country side where the preponderance
of Nigerians live. Expenditures were concentrated on projects with low returns. Often
cited in this category are the new capital city and the expenditures on iron and steel
industries. Fourth, as oil prices declined, Nigeria slashed investment drastically.
Nigeria's exchange rate appreciated. The economy went through periods of pain. The
economy showed signs of "severe stress". The distortion of the economy was obvious
to a lot of people by 1981 even though the Shagari regime believed that the economy
was resilient.
In the first quarter of 1982 the economic situation continued to deteriorate, and the
level of foreign exchange reserves was not sufficient to pay for one month's import bill.
Government therefore instituted a number of stringent macroeconomic measures
culminating in the stabilization act of 1982. The measures were desianed to protect the
balance of payments among the correction of other defects and also revamp the
economy. Critical among the measures were exchange control measures including
restriction on import licenses, an increase in duties and the initiation of an import deposit
program. fiscal and monetary policy measures. Despite the 1982 stabilization Act, the
economic situation continued to worsen. The economy reached a crisis point by 198384 when oil prices declined by 45 percent from the 1980 level. In 1983 the GDP growth
rate was - 6.7 percent, non-oil sector growth fell to -9.3, and petroleum sector growth
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to -2.5 percent. External and fiscal imbalance emerged. The external current account
deficit grew to 6 percent of GDP in 1983, and Nigeria's indebtedness impeded its access
to foreign capital. The budget deficit/GDP ratio reached 13 percent in 1983. Short term
trade arrears accumulated to the point at which foreigners and banks held back on
confirming letters of credit.
When another military regime under General Buhari took over in 1984, the
macroeconomic environment was significantly altered. The existing austere measures
of 1982 were augumented. Wage freeze was imposed and a large number of civil
servants were rendered redundant. In 1984. the inflation rate in Nigeria was 40 percent,
imports declined by about 23 percent and non-oil exports by about 44 percent. Capacity
utilization declined as plant closures were widespread as there was curtailment of access
to industrial sector imported inputs by import-dependent industries. By 1985, the
macroeconomic environment of Nigeria was characterized by major distortions arising
from excessive government control of economic activity including the control and
regulation of the financial system, foreign exchange and commodity markets among
others. The exchange rate was overvalued, budget deficit was rising, per capital income
was falling and the external indebtedness with its burden was also rising. It was against
this background that the structural adjustment program was adopted in 1986 with a view
to turning around the economy.
If for no other reasons than that of trade, the Nigerian economy is integrally linked
to the world economy and can therefore be affected by shocks generated outside its
economy. In the period under consideration. Nigeria experienced such shocks. Thus the
macroeconomic environment was also affected in addition to domestic programs and
policies by external factors. It was affected by the deep world recessions, large
appreciation of the US dollar against the leading currencies in 1980-85. followed by
large and abrupt fall in 1985-86.
This section must not be ended without mentioning a few important events in the
1973-85 period in general. Although the civil war ( 1967 to January 1970) brought the
era of rigid control of the economy. it was intensified with the dawn of the petroleum
era. Over the period 1973-1983 for example, the stringency of the control varies
inversely with the fortune of the oil prices. When for example the first oil shock (an
external shock) occurred in 1973-1974. the control of foreign trade and domestic prices
were relaxed. The porous nature of controls in general is well-known. A Oyejide (1991.
p.44) asserts "Thus large scale smuggling make non-sense of import controls as
prohibited items are prominently displayed on market stalls and a large and active

849

CBN ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL REVIEW VOL. 34 NO. 4

parallel market renders the nominally rigid exchange control regulations largely
ineffective."
The controls which were pervasive in the economy centered on at least three major
areas. These were import control (use of tariffs, import substitution, quantitative
restrictions QRs, import prohibition), foreign exchange control, credit control (interest
rate ceiling, ceiling in aggregate credit and sectoral credit allocation). There was
constant repression of the financial sector as evidenced by these controls.
(iv) The period 1986-96
It was very obvious that the economy could not grow anymore at the present trends
giving the mounting external debt of Nigeria and other macroeconomic distortions like
inflation, growth of the real GDP etc. Nigeria therefore adopted the Structural Adjustment
Program (SAP) with a view to turning around the economy. The objectives of the SAP
in Nigeria are too well-known to need recapitulation here. In a very large sense, the
adoption of the program represented another important watershed in Nigeria' s
macroeconomic environment. SAP was designed to deal with the distortions in the
economy and thus pave the way for the necessary growth and development within the
economy. As a package of economic policy, it was originally designed for two years.
It was not thought that all the economic malaise would take that length of time to solve
but rather that the economic foundation for growth and development would have been
laid 'within that time period. The adoption of the SAP altered again in significant ways
Nigeria' s macroeconomic environment. SAP tried to rectify the total dominance of
government within the economy, the setting of market determined exchange rate (the
original two-tier system), deregulation interest rate structure, regulation or the
restructuring of the banking system among others. For example, the banking sector was
reformed through a system of new laws culminating in the promulgation of two
significant laws. The amendment to the Central Bank of Nigeria Act, and the Bank and
Other Financial Institutions Decree (BOFID). These two laws along with the
standardization of accounting standards altered in very significant ways the
macroeconomic environment in which banks and other financial institutions are
expected to operate.
In terms of total effects on the economy, there are both positive and negative
effects of SAP. Some of the effects are noticeable in dilapidated taxis all over Ibadan,
and the pool of retired people, level ofunemployment, the deterioration in infrastructural
facilities and the deterioration in the health and educational sector in general.

Ajayi

850

Perhaps it suffices to mention a few things about how SAP has altered the
macroeconomic environment. First, it attempted to alter the rigid control environment
to that of subjecting prices to market forces. The second is that it has brought about a
major decline in the expenditure of the social sector thus defeating one of the major aims
of the program. Thus over the years there has been a systematic decline in a number of
sectors including the health sector in particular. Additionally. it has created new class
of the poor. It is now known that more people are hungrier than they were some years
ago. What about the industrial sector; the underutilization of industries, the systematic
increase in the number of unemployed, thanks to the streams of unemployed being
turned out by both the private and the government sectors. Many of our banks have gone
distressed or technically insolvent. They were undercapitalized, dangerously illiquid
and were burdened with high ratios of non-performing loans. Many of the 'distressed'
banks today have imposed a lot of hardship for people who have done all that they can
to save the little which they had. Many of the problems of the banks have been brought
about by fraud and forgeries within the bank, and of course the macroeconomic
environment of the bank which has not been favourable. It is not often realised that the
financial sector and the real sector of the economy are inextricably interwoven.
Activities in the real sector of the economy are necessary ingredients for growth in the
financial sector.
Looking very closely at the distressed banks. there are three explanations which
can be offered. First, between 1986 and 1993, foreign exchange was usually valued less
in the official market a opposed to what obtained in the parallel market. Given the
discrepancy, round tripping between markets was very lucrative. The number of banks
multiplied, many having no other substantive business other than dealings in foreign
exchange. Since 1994. these profitable opportunities began to dry up. In that year, the
parallel market became illegal. Second, the bad debts that accumulated was as a result
of lending being guided by favoritism or the dispensation of patronage. Third, the
scarcity of trained personnel relative to the growth of the banking sector, inadequate
audit procedures led to greater incidences of fraud by directors, staff and customers of
financial institutions. Of course needless to say that the existence of many distressed
banks has altered Nigeria's macroeconomic environment. The purging of banks is
central to the need to present a cleaner and sane image of business in Nigeria.
It is appropriate to point tQ a number of lessons that have been learnt about
structural adjustment in Africa (Ajayi, 1994). The first is that there is no ..quick fix". The
erroneous impression was created , for example, that the economic malaise afflicting
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countries adopting the SAP could be solved in a short time. It was thought for example
by many Nigerians that the economic malaise afflicting the economy could be dealt
with within a very short period. Distortions have existed in the economy for years. It
could therefore not be wished away in a very short period. A lot of people expected that
structural adjustment would banish away in a quick swoop all the economic ills
affecting the nation. The second is that the dictum of "getting the price right" as tl}e
dictum of policy effectiveness has not worked in an environment where the infrastructures
facilities leave much to be desired. Most important of these infrastructures are
transportation network and the system of communications. The third lesson relates to
the external environment faced by the country undertaking SAP. To the extent that these
environments are hostile, they would be unconductive to growth and development. In
the case of Nigeria, the trading environments in the 1980s and 1990s were certainly not
as good as they were in the 1960s and 1970s. Fourth, the heavy external burden with the
debt overhang has done a lot to retard growth and development.
The period since 1993 has been the most challenging period in our life history. The
last three years before that date witnessed the greatest political and expensive political
program ever. Thus upsurge of oil prices during the gulf crisis in 1991 aided the pursuit
of the political program that was being pursued at that time. The transition to civil rule
was awaited with greatest expectancy. The various aftermaths of the election created
significant uncertainty with serious macroeconomic implications. There are not too
many truthful Nigerians today who would not realise the interwovenness of politics and
economics in our body polity and the effects on the macroeconomic environment. The
upheaval created by the uncertainty of the departure of the Babangida regime, the
installation of the interim government with various strikes, demonstrations etc. did not
produce macroeconomic environment which was conductive to economic growth and
development.
The relationship between governance and economic development has been succintly
expressed in three simple but extremely useful statements (Conable. 1991 p.12):
"Capacities are directly linked to the question of good governance and efficient
administration.
"Political uncertainty and arbitrariness evident in so many parts of sub-Saharan
Africa are major constraints on the region's development."
" Investors will not take risks. entrepreneurs will not be creative, and people will
not participate - if they feel they are facing a capricious, unjust. or hostile political
environment."
Need l say more?
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IV RECENT MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT OR PA YING FOR PAST
MIST AKES OF THE 1970s AND 1980s IN THE 1990s.
What is the situation now? I suppose the right question is to ask what is the most
rece,,nt macroeconomic environment? We can look at a few statistics on saving and
investment, GNP per capital. external debt and the external debt burdens and indices of
macroeconomic performance. The savings and investment as percentages of GDP are
shown in table 1. The GDP per capital declined steadily since 1980 as can be seen in
table 2. Nigeria is presently under the weight of debt overhang. Her external debt is the
largest of the severely-indebted low income sub-Saharan Africa countries. The external
debt of Nigeria which was $8.9 billion in 1980rose to $32.5 billion in 1993. The weight
of the external burden of Nigeria in recent times is shown in table 3 by the debt burden
indicators. The external debt of Nigeria is several times greater than its exports of goods
and services. The external debt service consumed about 30 percent of resources in 1992.
The importance of the external debt on the macroeconomic environment can be seen
when the scheduled external debt service relative to government revenue and government
expenditures are shown. In 1994, this represented 105 percent and 75 percent, respectively.
The external debt distress measure can also be measured by looking at the relationship
between the amount due and the amount paid shown in table 4. In 1993, the ratio stood
at 36 percent. This really shows the extent of distress.
We show in table 5 some macroeconomic indices of performance in the period
between 1977-1994. As can be seen from the table, for the period 1977-86, it was 0.82
but it declined to -12.53 in the period 1987-94.

V.

THE LATE SUMMARY IN A NUTSHELL?

What is the summary of an overview of Nigeria' s macroeconomic environment
with respect to Nigeria's growth and development? One of the key lessons from the
analyses so far is that governance and the proper machinery for development management
are critical ingredients for successful outcome of development thrust. The macroeconomic
environment and events in Nigeria have been heavily dependent on the oil sector and
on the behavior of government which owns the oil sector. In addition to owning the oil
sector, government maintained a rigid control regime which not only prevented the
price mechanism to reflect relative scarcities in the various markets. Additionally
government did not provide the conductive environment for the operation of the private
sector in development and growth. In the periods under review , a massive investment
expansion was engineered in response to the positive terms of trade shock mentioned
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earlier. The investment rate was however larger than the savings rate which eventually
called for foreign savings and massive current account deficit. Borrowing abroad to
-fmance investment boom did not create the necessary macroeconomic environment for
sustainable income growth and economic development. Neither did the fiscal deficit,
inflation, extra-budgetary expenditures etc.
The summary of a summary of the overview can be summed up using the words
of Hope Sr. (1996, p.152) which l believe is much applicable Nigeria: "Elusive
development in the Third World has resulted in among other things, tremendous public
sector deficits, unmanageable debt, diminished living standards, an obsolete and
deteriorating physical infrastructure, rapid urbanization, corrupt bureaucracies,
widespread poverty, high rates of unemployment, and spiral inflation. In addition,
development planning and other state interventionist policies have crowded out what
were once vibrant private sectors and led to the ascendancy of inefficient pubic
enterprises that are unprofitable and impose a budgetary burden upon the Third World
governments."
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Table 1: Nigeria: Gross Domestic Investment and Savings
(In percent of GDP)

1980
23
22*

Notes:

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

8

19

9

4

8

2

1

14*

14*

14*

15*

16*

17*

15*

* refers to gross domestic investment, and the other to gross domestic
savings.

Source:

World Banlc: World Tables, 1995.
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Table 2: Nigeria: GDP per capital
(In US dollars)

1980

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1,160

460

390

350

350

350

330

300

Source: World Bank: World Bank Atlas, Several Years.
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Table 3: Nigeria: Debt Burden Indicators
(In percent)

1980

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

ED/XGS

33

390.50

417.40

315.50

241.50

271.60

241.70

ED/GNP

10.10

125.90

107.30

111.90

107.30

108.60

110.70

DS/XGS

4.30

14.20

29.60

22.10

23.60

26.60

29.40

IT/XGS

3.40

8.30

20.40

15.40

13. 10

17.80

13.20

IT/GNP

1.00

2.70

5.20

5.50

5.80

7.10

6.10

NOTES:
ED/XGS
ED/GNP
DS/XGS
IT/XGS
IT/GNP

=
=
=
=
=

DEBT/EXPORT
DEBT/GNP
DEBT SERVICF./EXPORTS
INTEREST/EXPORTS
INTEREST/GNP

Source: World Bank: World Debt Tables, 1994-95.

1993

100.7

4.10
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Table 4: Nigeria: External Debt Distress Measure, 1989-93.
Total debt service paid to Total debt service due
(In ratio percent)

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

0.36

0.58

0.57

0.60

0.36

Source: World BanJc: World BanJc Tables, 1995.
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Table S: Nigeria: Some macroeconomic Indices of Economic Performance
(In percent)

Average Growth
GNP per Capita
1977-86

·2.02

Index of Economic Performance

.....................................................

1987-93

1977-86

1987-94

-11.04

0.82

-12.53

The index of Economic performance is defined as g-log b where g is the average
growth in per capita income and bis the average inflation defined as the growth rate in
the consumer price index.

Source: World Bank: The World Bank Atlas
IMF, World Economic Outlook
IMF. IFS Yearbook, 1995.

859

CBN ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL REVIEW VOL. 34 NO. 4

REFERENCES
Ajayi, S, Ibi, " A Macroeconomic Approach to External Debt; The case of Nigeria;·
African Economic Research Consortium Research Paper. No. 8
(Nairobi: Initiative Publishers, 1991)
_ _ _ _ _, "An Economic Analysis of Capital Flight from Nigeria, "World Bank
Western African Department, Working Paper Series, No. 993
(Washington: World Bank. 1992).
_ _ _ _ _ _, "Nigeria' s External Indebtedness: The Burden and Prospects for
Growth" in Applied Economics and Economic Policy edited by Oyejide,
T. A. and Mike I. Obadan (Ibadan: University Press, 1993).
_ _ _ _ _, "The State of Research on the Macroeconomic Effectiveness of
Structural Adjustment Programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa," in Structural
Adjustment and Beyond in Sub-Saharan Africa, edited by Rolph Van
der Hoeven and Fred Van der Kraaji (James Currey: London. 1994).
_ _ _ _ _, "Capital Flight and External Debt in Nigeria" , African Economic
Research Consortium Research Paper, No. (Nairobi: Initiative
Publishers, 1995).
Central Bank of Nigeria, Economic Policy Reforms in Nigeria, (Lagos, Research
Department, 1993 ).
Conable, Barber B., Reflections on Africa: The Priority of Sub-Saharan Africa in
Economic Development. (Washington. D.C.: World Bank), 1991.
Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN), Third National Development Plan 1975-80,
The Central Planning Office, Lagos, 1975.
Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN), Fourth National Development Plan 1981-85,
Federal Ministry of National Planning, Lagos. 1980.

Ajayi

860

-Hope, Sr., Kempe Ronald, Development in the Third World: From Policy Failure to
Policy Reform (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1996).
Husain, Ishrat and Rasid Paruqee, (ed) Adjustment in Africa: Lessons from Country
Case Studies. (Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 1994).
Little, IMO, et al. Boom, Crisis, and Adjustment: The Macroeconomic Experience of
Development,Countries. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
Ojo, M. 0., "A Review and Appraisal of Nigeria's Experience with Financial Sector
Reform," Central Bank, Research Department Occasional Paper, No.8,

1993.
Oyejide, T. Ademola, "Trade Shock, Oil Boom and the Nigeria Economy 1973-83,
mimeograph.
Summers, Lawrence H., 0 The Challenges of Development." Finance and Development.
(Wa.,cihington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1993).
_ _ _ _ _, Adjustment in Africa; Reforms, Results and the Road Ahead, (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

